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PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE LAW OF DIVORCE
NOAH WEINSTEIN*
In 1822 the Governor of the State of Missouri signed the bill which
established the great seal of the State. It is inscribed with the motto Sal-as
Populi Suprema Lex Esto, which is generally translated, "The Welfare of
the People Shall Be the Supreme Law."
But it was not until shortly before the beginning of the present century
that jurists started to think in terms of human wants, desires, and expecta-
tions rather than of human wills. Legal rules began to be measured by the
extent to which they achieved the ends for which law exists rather than by
the older method of judging law by criteria drawn from itself. Dean Pound
would consider law as a social institution to satisfy social wants, and sees
in "legal history the record of a continually wider recognizing and satisfying
of human wants or claims or desires through social control; a more em-
bracing and more effective securing of social interests."'
Although it is understandable that some lag in time should exist before
the law reflects the generally accepted opinions of society, in the history
of divorce law it has become apparent that, at least as far as the State of
Missouri is concerned, the law has not developed, in spite of the recognized
changes in the complexities of the marital relationship. Divorce law, rather
than making an effort to satisfy existing social wants and thereby achieving
the end for which law exists, subjects itself to the criticism of Justice Holmes
that:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.2
Any critical examination of the fundamentals underlying laws regu-
lating divorce must start with a consideration of the social problem in-
*Circuit Judge, St. Louis County, Missouri. A.B., Harvard 1926, LL.B., 1929.
1. POUND, AN INTRODUcTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 42, 47 (rev. ed.
1954). See also Heath v. Heath, 85 N.H. 419, 422, 159 Atl. 418, 420 (1932): "It
seems self-evident that law incompatible with our institutions or unadapted to our
circumstances is against public policy."
2. Holmes, Tire Path of tre Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
(307)
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volved, and in particular, the changes that have come about through the
years. Marriage failure in the United States has received much attention.
That the stability of our family life is threatened has been characterized
a "trite understatement." 3 The serious nature of the crisis in the family
system due to the act of divorce has been recognized by sociologists who
have devoted their professional lives to its study.4
Of concern is the upswing of the divorce rate, with few exceptions,
during the past hundred years. In 1860, immediately prior to the Civil War,
the rate of divorce was 1.2 divorces annually per 1,000 existing marriages.
By 1900 this rate had increased to 4 per 1,000 existing marriages, and
thereafter steadily increased, with the exception of the depression years,
1930-1935, until it reached a peak in 1946 of 18.2 per 1,000. Since the
unusually high peak of 1946, the rate has leveled off at approximately 9
divorces annually per 1,000 existing marriages.5
It is interesting to note that although the divorce rate has been gen-
erally upward, there have been four breaks in this trend: immediately after
the Civil War and the two World Wars, the divorce rate increased sharply
and then fell off to the prewar level; and during the depression of the 1930's,
beginning with the stock market crash on October 29, 1929, the divorce
rate dropped dramatically, reversing the uptrend of the preceding years
of prosperity.,
Numerically, the number of divorces granted by courts throughout the
United States stood at 7,380 in 1860, reached an all-time high of 610,000
in 1946, dropped to 377,000 in 1955 and thereafter increased to 395,000 in
1959. The provisional figures for 1960 indicate an increase of approximately
4.8 per cent.7
An attempt to compare the divorce rate in our country with other
nations of course is rather difficult, but from available reports it is indicated
that for comparable time periods the divorce rate in the United States is
3. Alexander, The Lawyer in thze Family Court, 5 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE
Ass'N J. 172 (1959).
4. ZIMMERMAN & CERVANTES, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY (1956). For a
positive approach, see ZIMMERMAN & CERVANTES, SUCCESSFUL AMERICAN FAMILIES(1960).
5. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 90 (1959). U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, TRENDS 5 (1961).
6. JACOBSON, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 90-93.
7. 9 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDuc. & WELFARE, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS
REP. 7 (No. 13, May 31, 1961); 1959 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
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about 50 per cent greater than in England and Wales, 50 per cent greater
than Denmark, and 100 per cent greater than Sweden. s
The divorce courts in Missouri have contributed at least their fair
share to the national total. Starting in 1940 with slightly more than 11,000
decrees, the high was reached in 1946, in accordance with the national trend,
with approximately 26,000. In the following years, the rate leveled off at
11,000 to 12,000 per annum. In 1960, the total of 11,320 was slightly less
than the 1959 total of 11,695.'
A comparison of the divorce rate in Missouri with the national rate
is possible by two methods. First, considering the number of divorces per
1,000 population, the divorce rate in Missouri was 50 per cent greater than
the national rate in the years 1940-1946. Thereafter the comparative rate
in Missouri declined to a point where it was 40 per cent greater than the
national rate in the years 1947-1950. In the period 1951-1953, it
was approximately 30 per cent greater. In 1954 and 1955, it dropped to 20
per cent over the nation's, to 10 per cent in 1956, rose again to 20 per cent
in 1957 and 1958, and in 1959 it had increased to 30 per cent over the na-
tional rate.10
A second available method of comparison is based on the number of
marriages and divorces in the same year. In 1959, the total number of mar-
riages in the United States was 1,494,000 and the number of divorces was
395,000.11 This represents a current national dissolution rate of 26.4 per
cent. In Missouri, in 1959, marriages totaled 34,352 and court dissolutions
11,695,12 giving a current dissolution rate of 34 per cent which was 30 per
cent greater than the national rate of 26.4 per cent. This result is the same
as that arrived at by the first method used above.
It is impossible to carry this comparison between state and nation into
1960 because at this writing final figures for the national divorce rate are
not available. However, Missouri reports 35,368 marriages and 11,320 di-
vorces which represents a current dissolution rate of 32 per cent (compared
8. 1958 UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SocAl AFFAIRS, DEMOGRAPH-
ic YEARBOOK 472-74 (1958).
9. 1960 Mo. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH & WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS OF MIs-
soUrI 15 (1961); JACOBSON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 171.
10. Mo. DEIT OF PUB. HEALTH & WELFARE, VITAL STATISTIcs OF Missoul;
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES,
reports for the years involved.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 2-1,
2-11.12. 1960 Mo. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH & WELFARE, Op. ci. supra note 9, at 15.
3
Weinstein: Weinstein: Proposed Changes in the Law of Divorce
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
to 34 per cent for 1959). There were 375 fewer divorces and 1,016 more
marriages in Missouri in 1960 than in 1959, or the equivalent of a decrease
in divorce from 2.8 to 2.6 per 1,000 population and an increase in marriages
from 8.1 to 8.2 per 1,000 population.'"
Comparatively, the provisional estimate of United States marriages in
1960 was 1,527,000 or 8.5 per 1,000 population, as it was in 1959, Missouri's
rate being slightly less. The national provisional divorce rate in 1960 was
probably 4.8 per cent larger than in 1959. Thus it appears Missouri is not
following the national trend for at least the moment, but this is not in-
dicative of any firm movement in the direction of reducing the abnormally
high divorce rate in Missouri as compared to the national rate.14
The immediate involvement of children in divorce throughout the
United States is dramatically illustrated by available statistics. Since 1953
over 330,000 children each year are affected by the divorce of their parents.
The increase in the number of divorces with children involved is startling.
In 1953, 45.5 per cent of all divorces in the nation involved children. This
rate increased until 1959 when 64.4 per cent of the cases dealt with children.
In each 100 divorces, 85 children were involved in 1953 with a steady in-
crease over the years until 1957 when the ratio was 1 child for each divorce.
In that year, 50 per cent of the divorce cases involved no children but the
other 50 per cent averaged 2 children per divorce.15 Accordingly, in 1957
with a total of 381,000 divorces reported, it follows that 381,000 children
were involved.'
Children in Missouri are affected in great numbers by legal termination
of marriage. In 1960, a total of 11,607 children were involved in 11,107
cases (213 cases did not report the number involved). In 5,307 cases no
children were involved, representing 47.7 per cent of the total reporting. In
5,800 cases reported there were a total of 11,607 children or an average of
2 children in each family. It is thus indicated that in Missouri, 104 children
are involved in each 100 divorces. Specifically in Missouri in 1960, 2,505
cases involved 1 child each; 1,814, 2 children each; 854, 3 children each; 373,
13. Ibid.
14. 9 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 4, 7.
15. 1959 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, Op. cit. supra note 7, at
2-14.
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4 children each; 154, 5 children each; 64, 6 children each; 25, 7 children each;
8, 8 children each; and 3, 9 or more children.17
One result of the large involvement of children in divorce and separa-
tion of parents without benefit of law, is the increase in cost to government
by reason of payments made by the Social Security Administration in the
form of aid to dependent children. That agency of the government reported
In 1960 that 45 per cent of all families receiving relief for needy children
involved divorced or separated parents.'
Many who have delved into the far-reaching results of divorce and the
broken home report some apparent causal connection with juvenile de-
linquency.19 One authority states that the broken home is an etiological
factor of importance in that it produces emotional instability.20 Juvenile
court authorities are impressed by the fact that 40 per cent or more of
delinquent children come from broken homes, and that disintegrated families
furnish four or five times their proportion of the reformatory population
of the United States.2 ' Some investigators have estimated that broken
homes proportionately contribute twice as many children to the ranks of
delinquency as unbroken homes.
22
These investigations have been extended to cover the history of
delinquents for a period of 15 years-from their juvenile court experience
at an average age of 14 through the years up to an average age of 29. The
result indicates that the efforts of delinquents to mend their ways and
achieve a normal life were "significantly" less successful among the products
of broken homes.
23
The effect of the broken home has also been considered in relation to
17. 1960 Mo. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH & WELFARE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 55.
18. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, ILLEGITIMACY AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM 31 (1960).
19. Shulman, The Family and Juvenile Delinquency, 261 Annals 21 (1949), in
GLUECK, THE PROBLEM OF DELINQUENCY 128 (1959).
20. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 123-25 (1950).
21. Shideler, Family Disintegration and the Delinquent Boy in the United
States, 8 J. CRIM. L. 709 (1918); GLUECK, ONE THOUSAND JUVENILE DELINQUENTS(1934).
22. Shideler, op. cit. supra note 21; GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 20, at 88-91,
122:
Children of broken homes are over-represented in state institutions
for delinquent children. As a category they commit slightly more delin-
quent behavior in high school than those from unbroken homes. Their
chances of being sent to an institution are, however, more than twice as
great as is the case for children from unbroken homes. This suggests
differential reaction to their delinquent behavior by law enforcement and
judicial agencies, and perhaps by parents and the general public as well.
NYE, FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS AND DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR 47-48 (1958).
23. GLUECK, JUVENILE DELINQUENTS GROWN UP 174 (1940).
1962]
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the criminal offender. One authority has flatly concluded that those who
live with a wife are less frequently imprisoned than those who are single,
separated, or divorced; that stable and satisfying marriages tend to pre-
vent or reduce criminality and may be largely responsible for terminating
criminal careers.24
After conviction, a similar result was observed among those placed
on probation; that is, those probationers who were married succeeded more
frequently than those who were single, separated, divorced, or widowed .2
Research into the marital history of former juvenile delinquents has
revealed that their divorce rate was three times as great as a comparable
non-delinquent group. In addition, 10 per cent of the delinquent group had
2 or more divorces and 4 per cent 3 or more, whereas among the non-
delinquent group those who had been divorced had been divorced only
once.2 0
Although we do not suggest a cause and effect theory, the strange
parallel between divorce and suicide is at least worthy of sober considera-
tion and further investigation. The frequency of suicide among divorced
persons is slightly more than three times as great as among married couples. 27
The statistical background that has been presented makes it readily
apparent that changes in the family system have occurred during the past
one hundred years; that intra-family relationships have become more com-
plex just as inter-family relationships have become more involved. This
should be a completely acceptable conclusion when we consider the bare
facts of population changes in the United States. In 1850, the nation had a
population of approximately 23 million. By 1900, it had increased to approx-
imately 76 million, to 105 million in 1920, to 150 million by 1950, and to
180 million by 1960.28 During the first half of this century while the popula-
tion of the nation doubled, the number of households tripled. Of great sig-
nificance is the increased work activity of married women. Almost 40
per cent of all women whose children are of school age are employed.2 9
24. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CoRUPnrION 197 (1960).
25. MONACHESI, PREDICTrION FAcTORS IN PROBATION (1932).
26. Robins & O'Neal, The Marital History of Former Problem Children, 5
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 346, 349 (1958).
27. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, Mortality from Selected Causes
by Marital Status [1949-513, 39 VITAL STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORTS 426 (1956).
28. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrTED STATES
(1959).
29. THE NAT'L MANPOWER COUNCIL, WOMANPOWER 3 (1957).
In both rural and urban samples, delinquent behavior is greater in
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A fundamental change in the character of our population was first indi-
cated by the 1920 census, which reported more than half of the population
of the United States as living in cities. We no longer can consider ourselves
as a "folk society" integrated by the force of tradition and convention.
The increase in the size and density of population has produced a mutation
in social structure, social process, and interpersonal relations. Problems both
new and acute that result from urban living did not exist in rural America. SO
The household has been losing its disciplinary effectiveness under the condi-
tions of urban life. Juvenile courts and courts of domestic relations have
taken over much of what was once the jurisdiction of the head of the family.
What has been the history of the law in its recognition of the vital
changes in the family structure and what developments have occurred
within the law that provide a more effective securing of social interests?
It is proper in common law jurisdictions to attempt to demonstrate
the orderly development and growth of legal concepts upon a basis of rea-
son and human experience. And in many branches of our law the step by
step growth of these concepts is plainly traceable through the judicial pro-
nouncements or legislative acts of English and American judges and law-
making bodies. But occasionally efforts to show the purported reasonable de-
velopment of a legal concept run afoul of a hiatus or an inexplicable hybrid
which defies any attempt at logical dissection. We find islands of legal
doctrine that are for the most part arbitrarily anchored in the historical
past, sheltered by a mystical aura of infallibility, abandoned by reason and
experience but kept alive by judges and legislators who appear reluctant to
recognize, in the particular area, the facts of life.
Since we propose to propound the obvious-that our current laws gov-
erning divorce are urgently in need of change-it might be well to review
the origin and development of the customs and laws regulating the marital
status. Of particular concern is the modification and change of these laws
and their development or regression to meet the generally accepted social
reaction to the status popular from time to time-a course which for the
most part has been vital and responsive in England until the present, but
which in most American states has remained static since the time of their
adoption into American law.
"What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder," 3'
30. HAUSER, POPULATION PERsPzcrins 51, 52, 132-35 (1960).
31. St. Matthew 19:6.
19621
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is followed, with two verses intervening, by an exception that the man may
"put away his wife" for fornication.32
A further exception was applied in those situations in which a believer is
married to an unbeliever and the latter departs, the believer (husband or
wife) "[not being] under bondage in such cases."' 3
What of the status of the wife "put away" by the husband for fornica-
tion? "And whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery. '34
And the husband who "put away his wife"? "Whosoever shall put away
his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth
adultery. ' "
Is this an intended indication that the innocent husband of an adulterous
wife might remarry? It could not be so construed by the church which
denied the dissolubility of a valid church marriage. 6 But a marriage to be
valid in the eyes of the church and consequently indissoluble had to be
consummated, and if not consummated, it might be dissolved.
It would appear that the church maintained the indissolubility of a
valid consummated marriage but recognized a divortium imperfectem or
separatio quoad tltorum et mensam (a "separation from bed and board"),
in which the parties are separated and forbidden to live or cohabit together
for a determinate or indeterminate period, but this did not otherwise affect
the marriage itself and left the spouses unable to marry any other person.
The grounds for maintaining such proceedings for a partial divorce or
separation of the spouses was primarily adultery or other equivalent carnal
sin," and the separation could be for a definite or indeterminate period.
The church also acted on the husband-wife relationship in another way.
It could and would dissolve a marriage which may have appeared perfectly
valid through the process denominated a divorce a vincubo matrimonii*38
In this situation the church declared the marriage unlawful from its incep-
tion because of some canonical impediment such as consanguinity of the
parties.
This ecclesiastical proceeding implied that a marriage which never had
32. St. Matthew 19:9.
33. 1 Corinthians 7:15.
34. St. Mattlew 19:9.
35. Ibid.
,36. THE CANONS AND DECREES, COUNCIL OF TRENT 195 [Canon 7] (Water-
worth transl. 1848).
37. Id. at 195 [Canon 8].
38. As we use legal terms today, we would consider such proceedings an
annulment of the marriage contract rather than a "divorce from the bond of mar-
riage." See 2 MORGAN, THE DOCTRINE OF LAW AND MARRIAGE 220-23 (1826).
[Vol. 27
8
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been valid would remain invalid. However, in its application, the rules
designating "impediments" (impedimenta dirimentia) to a valid marriage
became so numerous that the decree of nullity often served the purpose of a
true divorce. "Spouses who had quarrelled began to investigate their pedi-
grees and were unlucky if they could discover no impedimentum dirimens."8 91
(It permitted the dissolution of many marriages which theoretically were
indissoluble.)
In England in the early part of the seventeenth century there developed
a revival of the old canon law and for several generations it was said that
the gates of exit from true matrimony had all been closed with the excep-
tion of death. In effect, the reformation had demolished the machinery for
annulling marriages on fictitious grounds so that it became impossible for a
man to escape matrimonial bondage by swearing he was his wife's distant
cousin.
This stern attitude in England towards divorce relented to some degree
toward the latter part of the seventeenth century. Although a valid English
marriage could not be dissolved by judicial authority, a husband who had
obtained from the ecclesiastical court a divorce a mensa et thoro might
thereafter dissolve his marriage by a special Act of Parliament. But such
parliamentary divorce was granted only for adultery. A wife might also dis-
solve the marriage, but apparently a greater burden was placed upon her,
for her husband's adulterous action had to be of an aggravated nature, such
as incestuous intercourse by her husband with some of her relatives.0
Proceedings ending in a divorce by the Act of Parliament route were
so costly 41 and difficult' 2 that up to 1857, when the Matrimonial Causes
39. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 391 n.1 (Ist ed.
1895).
40. "It was not until 1923 that the sexes were put on a footing of equality
as to the grounds for divorce." RADCLIFFE & CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYST=M
228 n.1 (1st ed. 1937).
"[I]n England the course of Parliament in granting divorce by special
act was . . .to refuse the remedy when the wife was applicant." 1 BISHOP, MAR-
RIAGE, DIVORCE & SEPARATION § 1505 (1891). See also MACQUEEN, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS & PRIVY COUNCIL
465-668 (1842); 2 MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 38, at 237-61.
41. That these proceedings existed for the wealthy is rather dramatically
illustrated by the words credited to Maule, J., in a bigamy case styled R v. Hall,
tried at Warwick Assizes on April 1, 1845:
Prisoner, you have been convicted of the grave crime of bigamy.
The evidence is clear that your wife left you and your children to live in
adultery with another man, and that you then intermarried with another
woman, your wife being still alive. You say that this prosecution is an
instrument of extortion on the part of the adulterer. Be it so; yet you had
no right to take the law into your own hands. I will tell you what you
9
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Act4 s created the English Divorce Court, only 317 divorce bills passed parlia-
ment, and the first women got a parliamentary divorce in 1801-130 years
after this procedure was adopted.
When the American Colonies separated from England, domestic affairs
in the mother country were handled exclusively by the ecclesiastical courts;
ecclesiastical law did not recognize the dissolution of a valid marriage; di-
vorces a mensa et thoro were allowed only for adultery and cruelty; and the
right to contract a valid second marriage was the costly privilege of the few
who could obtain a special Act of Parliament after an ecclesiastical court
decree of divorce a mensa et thoro.
Ecclesiastical courts were never established in the Colonies, and for a
ought to have done; and, if you say you did not know, I must tell you
that the law conclusively presumes that you did. You ought to have in-
structed your attorney to bring an action against the seducer of your wife
for criminal conversation. That would have cost you about a hundred
pounds. When you had recovered (though not necessarily actually ob-
tained) substantial damages against him, you should have instructed your
proctor to sue in the Ecclesiastical Courts for a divorce a mnsa et tkoro.
That would have cost you two hundred or three hundred pounds more.
When you had obtained a divorce a mensa et tkoro, you should have
appeared by counsel before the House of Lords in order to obtain a private
Act of Parliament for a divorce a vinculo matrinmoui which would have
rendered you free and legally competent to marry the person whom you
have taken on yourself to marry with no such sanction. The Bill might
possibly have been opposed in all its stages in both Houses of Parliament,
and altogether you would have had to spend about a thousand or twelve
hundred pounds. You will probably tell me that you never had a thousand
farthings of your own in the world; but, prisoner, that makes no difference.
Sitting here as an English judge, it is my duty to tell you that this is not
a country in which there is one law for the rich, and another for the
poor. You will be imprisoned for one day, which period has already been
exceeded as you have been in custody since the commencement of the
Assizes.
MEGARRY, MISCELLANY-AT-LAw 116 (rev. ed. 1958). See also 2 MORGAN, OP. Cit.
supra note 38, at 261.
42. More than 100 years ago, when divorce in the modem sense was possible
only by Act of Parliament, an unhappily married Town Clerk was promoting a
Waterworks Bill for his town; and in clause 64, mingled with something technical
about filter beds and stopcocks, appeared the innocent little phrase, "and the Town
Clerk's marriage is hereby dissolved." Nobody could explain how these words got
there, and, in fact, nobody ever noticed them while the Bill was going through
Parliament, for everyone was fast asleep long before they got to that clause. In due
course the Royal Assent was given, and the Town Clerk lived happily ever after.
At a ripe old age he died, still in harness, and a successor had to be found.
The question then arose whether this particular provision was personal to the de-
ceased Town Clerk or whether unhappily married members of the local government
service could regard this particular town clerkship as a sort of Chiltem Hundreds.
MEGARRY, op. cit. supra note 41, at 345.
43. Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. ch. 85, § 6. This act created
the Divorce Court and gave it the powers previously exercised by the Ecclesiastical
Court, and also the power to dissolve a marriage, a divorce a vincido nutrimonii.
10
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number of years divorce law was not administered for want of a tribunal.
There were no divorces in the colony of New York during more than 100
years preceding the time when the colony became a state, and the only
divorces ever recorded in the colony were the four granted by Governor
Lovelace in 1670 and 1672. The laws of England concerning divorce were
never adopted in that colony. The New York courts recognized that the
English law of divorce was the ecclesiastical law and not the common law
of England, administered by judges and courts whose jurisdiction never
existed either in the State or Colony of New York, and it was regarded as
no part of the common law which the State of New York adopted."
Divorce in the territory which included that area later to become the
State of Missouri began with the provisions contained in the Laws of the
Territory of Louisiana, Chapter 31, page 90 (May 13, 1807). Incidentally,
provision was made for a jury trial when requested by either party. Sub-
stantially the same provisions relating to divorce were reenacted in the Laws
of the Territory of Missouri, Chapter 196, page 80 (Jan. 29, 1817).
After admission of the State of Missouri into the Union, the legislature
provided that the circuit court had jurisdiction in all causes of divorce, ali-
mony, or maintenance, and that the practice and proceedings should be as
in equitable causes.45
Missouri courts did not, like New York, reject ecclesiastical law as a
part of the common law of England but on the contrary adopted the law
of the English ecclesiastical courts as a part of the body of the common
law which established precedents for divorce actions except as modified,
changed, or supplanted by statute.4
That Missouri also endeavored to follow the English practice of divorce
by legislative act is indicated by an examination of the session acts. Al-
though this practice was declared unconstitutional in 1835 as an invasion
of the powers delegated to the judicial branch of government,47 it continued
for many years thereafter.48
Accordingly, although ecclesiastical courts were never established in
the American colonies, Missouri in effect adopted the substantive law of
44. Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopkins 557 (N.Y. 1825); 2 VERNIER, AMERicAN
FAMILY LAWS § 81 (1931).
45. Div'orce & Alimony § 3, at 330, RSMo 1825.
46. Chapman v. Chapman, 269 Mo. 663, 666-70, 192 S.W. 448, 449-50 (1916);
Stokes v. Stokes, 1 Mo. 320 (1823).
47. State ex rel. Gentry v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120 (1835).
48. Richeson v. Simmons, 47 Mo. 20 (1870). See also Mo. CONsT. art. 3, §
40(2), prohibiting the granting of divorces by the general assembly.
1962]
11
Weinstein: Weinstein: Proposed Changes in the Law of Divorce
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
that court by considering it a part of the common law and empowered the
circuit court to act under the decisions of the ecclesiastical courts except as
modified, changed, or supplanted by statute.49
In this manner we have inherited a whole body of law which controls
absolute divorce from the bonds of matrimony from the English ecclesiasti-
cal court, which itself never admitted to having the power to dissolve a
valid consummated marriage except through the arbitrary process of de-
claring a marriage invalid because of the violation of its rules designating
"impediments" to a valid marriage.
Inherent in this body of law is a concept which is commonly designated
the "fault" doctrine. Although it became a basic principle in ecclesiastical
law, it in turn represents an artificial and inaccurate transference from
Roman Law, principally through the activity of one judge presiding in the
Consistory Court of London. This judge, Sir William Scott, better known as
Lord Stowell, in 1790 heard a husband's petition for a divorce a meinsa et
thoro charging the wife's adultery. The wife, in opposing her husband's peti-
tion, pleaded "I have not committed adultery; but if I have, you have barred
yourself from the remedy you pray, by your own misconduct of the same
species, for though adultery cannot be justified in itself, it may be legally
justified against you, by the proof that you have produced the evil of
which you pretend to complain."5 0
The judge upon hearing the evidence was completely convinced of the
wife's adultery, and of the husband's adultery as well, and dismissed the
petition. Then, for the first time as far as recorded decisions in divorce
cases are concerned, he announced the principle of law which withholds
from a guilty husband the remedy against a guilty wife. In support of this
rule the judge declared that it was a principle founded in Roman law. A
Roman magistrate had power to determine a wife's application for restitu-
tion of her dower. When the husband pleaded that the wife's adultery barred
her demand, the wife could in reply successfully plead the husband's adultery
in bar of his objection. The opinion admits, however, that this principle of
adjudicating property rights between husband and wife did not apply
directly to divorce since Roman divorce was a matter wholly within the
authority of the husband himself and not in the jurisdiction of the Roman
magistrate. But the judge, in his attempt to justify the adoption of a non-
existent principle, asserted that if the Roman magistrate had had jurisdiction
49. Chapman v. Chapman, supra note 46.
50. Forster v. Forster, 1 Hag. Con. 144, 145, 161 Eng. Rep. 504, 505 (1790).
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over divorce, the same principles which applied to property would apply
to divorce!
How fanciful Stowell's groping was, is made more evident when we
consider that his ecclesiastical court, unlike the Roman magistrate, could not
adjudicate property rights or the right to support. Such rights were de-
termined only in the English common law courts, which refused to be
coerced by the ecclesiastical courts into a recognition of the claim to support
of the adulterous wife by the equally adulterous husband.51 Thus Lord
Stowell, by refusing the adulterous husband a divorce a menrsa et thoro,
plainly ihtended to achieve the primary result of forcing the husband to
support the wife, but failed in his purpose since his court lacked jurisdiction
over such matters, and the common law courts, which did have jurisdiction
over support and property matters, refused to recognize his position.
Accordingly, the artificial ecclesiastical doctrine of recrimination, hav-
ing failed in its indirect attempt to protect the property rights of an equally
guilty wife, was repudiated by the Divorce Court, established by the 1857
Matrimonial Causes Act, as an absolute bar to divorce. It should be noted
that the 1857 act for the first time established absolute divorce from the
bonds of matrimony as a judicial process in England. This act did recognize
recrimination as a discretionary bar, but that was established as a matter for
judicial discretion. The court in exercising this discretion must take into
consideration, among other things: (1) the interest of the children of the
marriage; (2) the prospect of reconciliation between the parties; and (3)
the interest of the community at large, to be judged by maintaining a true
balance between respect for the binding sanctity of marriage and the social
considerations which make it contrary to public policy to insist on the main-
tenance of a union which has utterly broken down. If the court finds a di-
vorce to be the proper result, it may grant one to an equally guilty husband.
On the other hand, if the court determines that the ends of justice require
it, a divorce could be denied.5 2
This then is the development of a doctrine which as we will see per-
vades all divorce law in the United States. It is based on a pronouncement
by a single judge, in an ecclesiastical trial court (Consistory Court of Lon-
don) which had no jurisdiction to grant an absolute divorce from the bonds
of matrimony, made for the primary purpose of compelling a guilty husband
to support a guilty wife, which was a matter not in that court's jurisdiction
51. Govier v. Hancock, 6 T.R. 603, 101 Eng. Rep. 726 (1796).
52. Blunt v. Blunt, [1943] A.C. 517; TOLsToy, DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL
CAUSES 80 (4th ed. 1958).
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but was exclusively in the jurisdiction of the separate common law courts.
It is a doctrine which the common law courts refused to recognize in those
matters in their jurisdiction, and a doctrine which the only political agency
having power to grant an absolute divorce (Parliament) refused to recog-
nize.53 Finally, with the establishment of a Divorce Court in England with
the power to decree absolute divorce, the inclusion of the doctrine in the
statute law was so modified as to change completely its character from that
of an absolute bar to a permissive defense which the courts could use or re-
ject in their discretion if the best interest of the spouses, the children, and
the community required it.
That this doctrine was not recognized as common law in England is
made abundantly clear by the refusal of the common law courts of that
land to follow it. In the United States some courts adopted the ecclesiastical
decisions as common law and others rejected them. In any event, the de-
fense of recrimination and the general fault doctrine in divorce cases is
firmly entrenched in Missouri statute and case law. Statute law has pro-
hibited the courts in Missouri from granting a divorce where both parties
have been guilty of adultery." As to the matter of the petitioner proving he
is without fault or is innocent of any wrongdoing: the courts have at least
pretended to demand this badge of purity of spouses requesting a decree,
but in varying shades of pure white, depending upon the circumstances of
each case, and have ultimately resolved the problem by drawing the legal
conclusion that the conduct of the petitioner does or does not constitute
grounds for divorce.55
53. MACQUEEN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF
THE HoUSE OF LORDS 574 (1842).
54. § 452.030, RSMo 1959.
55. § 452.020, RSMo 1959. Simon v. Simon, 248 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Mo. 1952):
An "innocent" party is not required to conclusively prove freedom from all
fault, or such exemplary conduct as excludes any misconduct or all unwise
or uncalled-for acts. He or she need show only that, under all the circum-
stances of a particular case, he or she has not been guilty of conduct
constituting a ground or grounds for divorce..
Paxton v. Paxton, 319 S.W.2d 280, 287 (K.C. Ct. App. 1958), in which the appellate
court considered the innocence of the successful husband-plaintiff and made the
following observations:
It seems possible that some of plaintiff's explanations-for example that
one woman came to his hotel room to "brush her hair"--might have
strained the credulity of the trial judge. Certainly as we have read and
studied this record, we have been unable to visualize plaintiff in a white
robe, and have listened in vain to hear the rustle of a wing. However, as
previously pointed out, an appellate court usually defers to the finding of
the trial judge, especially as the credibility of witnesses. Moreover, this
marital ship has run hard aground on reefs and rocks. Probably the time
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The courts currently attempt to rely on one of two analogous legal
propositions to justify recrimination. The first is the so-called "clean hands"
maxim of equity. Plaintiff seeking a divorce must be without fault.58 But
equity relaxes this principle for many reasons and particularly for reasons
of sound and compelling social policy when the parties are not in pari delicto
or even when they are in parn delicto.57
The other popular analogy sometimes attempted is the contract theory.
Marriage, it is said, is a contract with mutually dependent covenants and
since both have breached the contract, the court will not aid either.' s But
with recrimination, courts generally do not consider it determinative whether
plaintiff's misconduct precedes or follows that of the defendant's. And, in
any event, courts, when the occasion demands, have no difficulty in
distinguishing marriage contracts from commercial contracts."
Perhaps the only historically exact basis for the rule lies in the words
of the fabricator of the rule, Lord Stowell: "It was a par delictum, subject
to the same rules of compensation, which leaves the parties to find their
common remedy in common humiliation, and mutual forgiveness."80
Developments in alleviating the hardship imposed by the doctrine in-
lude statutory provisions similar to the English statute allowing judicial
discretion in applying the bar and permitting divorce if considered in the
best interest of the parties concerned and the public generally. Likewise the
principle of comparative rectitude which authorizes granting a divorce to
the party least at fault when the best interests of the family members and
the state require it has received approval in some jurisdictions.",
has come for both crew and passengers to abandon the ship and go ashore.
We are unable and unwilling to hold that the trial court erred on this
question and we therefore, rule . . . that in this case the plaintiff is en-
titled to be considered in law as the innocent and injured party.
56. Franklin v. Franklin, 365 Mo. 442, 283 S.W.2d 483 (1955) (en banc).
57. 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 942 (4th ed. 1918); Hobbs v. Boat-
right, 195 Mo. 693, 93 S.W. 934 (1906).
58. Beeby v. Beeby, 1 Hag. Eccl. 789, 790, 162 Eng. Rep. 755, 756 (1799).
59. Heath v. Heath, 85 N.H. 419, 427, 159 Adt. 418, 422 (1932).
60. Proctor v. Proctor, 2 Hag. Con. 297, 298, 161 Eng. Rep. 747, 749 (1819).
For an interesting review of the career of Lord Stowell, see TOWNSEND, TWELVE
EMINENT JUDGES 279 (1846):
It would have been well for Sir Walter Scott (Lord Stowell), if, whilst
he thus sportively handled those dangerous playthings, marriage engage-
ments and their possibilities, he had himself learned caution from the
admirable lessons which he taught: but when did physician heal himself
.... As if to show the fallibility of human wisdom . .. he, the most pure
and correct of men both in his judicial and domestic relations, was doomed
to suffer much uneasiness from a single act of rashness in both. TowN-
SEND, op. cit. supra at 327.
61. Schirmer v. Schirmer, 84 Wash. 1, 145 Pac. 981 (1915).
15
Weinstein: Weinstein: Proposed Changes in the Law of Divorce
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The injection of the whole theory of recrimination in divorce
in addition to being historically inaccurate is fundamentally unsound and
incompatible with the interest of society in maintaining the basic family
status. The adoption of a theory of marital wrongdoing or fault as a basis
for divorce which not only requires the court to find that the defending
spouse has been guilty of some recognized statutory offense to the com-
plaining spouse but also that the complaining spouse has been free from
such offense requires a court to determine that which in most instances is
not susceptible to accurate determination. So long as law was theologically
influenced, the mysteries of the human mind and their evaluation were
assumed to be equally accessible. But with the secularization of the law,
the law as an order of external human conduct has become aware of its
inability to probe the depths of the human mind, and the emphasis has been
shifted from imposing adequate punishment for moral wrongdoing to pro-
tecting social and public interests. Modern law has constantly restricted
the principle of fault or guilt and has substituted the idea of social purpose
and advocated procedures for determining proper methods of preventing in-
jurious occurrences.
In evaluating the enigma of divorce, it would seem to be unneces-
sary to be reminded that the problem is not whether divorce should or
should not be permitted-but under what circumstances it should be per-
mitted. Every state in the United States now authorizes a divorce decree
under some circumstances. This unanimous acceptance of possible legal
termination of the marriage relationship occurred in 1949 when South Caro-
lina, under the prodding of its local bar associations, enacted a set of di-
vorce statutes thereby putting an end to the recognized practice of migra-
tory divorce or plural (though not legal) wives.
We are thus confronted with the realistic premise that divorce is recog-
nized as possible under a varying number of factual and legal circumstances.
We should then consider what ought to be done to protect the interest of
the parties affected, the spouses, their children, and society generally in the
form of the state.
Efforts to increase artificially the legal barriers in the way of divorce
have resulted in morally, if not legally, collusive subterfuges to avoid them,
or in shifting the litigation to a "more favorable" state.6 2 Tightening the
rules in one or more states thus cannot be effective without a uniform di-
62. Note, Migratory Divorce: The Alabama Experience, 75 HA~v. L. Rzv. 568(1962).
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vorce law in all states, and this is something that even if desirable is not
realizable. Certainly those states which make substantial profits in attract-
ing divorce business from other states would look with favor on "stricter"
divorce laws in all states but their own, and federal regulation in this area
of law is not now constitutionally possible.
It has been suggested that in this area of law the spirit of controversy
and contest should not be the dominant motive. In its essentials, a divorce
action is made up of several different parts which may be labeled: (1) the
interest of the state or the public in the stability of marriage and the family;
(2) the interest of each spouse in the marriage and its effect upon their
future happiness and well-being, moral, physical, mental and spiritual; (3)
the interest of children of the marriage; (4) property rights of the members
of the family covering the division of property, support of the wife, support
and education of the children; and (5) criminal aspects such as adultery,
cruelty, desertion or failure to support. In applying the procedure of litiga-
tion to a divorce case, we are in effect using the statutory grounds of di-
vorce-adultery, cruelty, general indignities and others-to determine in sub-
stance the victor in all the multi-phased issues in the five different categories.
In divorce procedure as it is almost universally applied, we must have one
successful and one unsuccessful litigant (except for the successful recrimi-
nation cases in which both parties are ejected by the court with the injunc-
tion to live together and "find sources of mutual forgiveness in the humilia-
tion of mutual guilt"). Yet it is doubtful that victory is the normal out-
come of divorce litigations. Most would agree that divorce should not be
considered by the courts as a suit for damages for breach of contract. At
least one could hardly assert that when a couple assume the obligations of
matrimony with all its most intimate personal relations, the parties are
contracting at "arms length." This is inconsistent with physical and biologi-
cal fact. Why should the law be shackled to historical precedents which,
if they ever were precedents, applied to social conditions which have long
since ceased to exist. It is more in keeping with the theory of law as
founded on "reason and experience," and with the law's obligation to keep
its approaches, procedures, and operation continually alert and adjusted to
the solution of human problems, that appropriate action be taken to sever
the ties of the law with an archaic and unreasoning approach to one of the
great social problems of our day, while a proper consideration of the bind-
ing sanctity of marriage is maintained and that important institution
strengthened in a real way.63
63. Heath v. Heath, supra note 59.
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The public has a right to expect from the profession of law something
more than moral myopia in human relations and something more than the
unreasoning "bread and precedent" diet of some of its judges.
A proper and adequate initial approach to the divorce problem may be
made within the framework of existing statutes with some slight modifica-
tions and additions. We would substitute first a change in judicial attitude.
The judge would not referee a battle between the spouses. Rather, he would
preside at a hearing having as its objective the termination or perpetuation
of the marriage relationship with all its diverse legal, financial, and social
problems. The "day in court" would be preserved inviolate and each party
would have the right to present his evidence. But the real issue would be:
should the marriage status be dissolved? The mere fact that one spouse has
applied for a divorce indicates an abnormal situation exists. The issues to
be resolved are the reasons that these two spouses are unable to live to-
gether in as mutually satisfactory a relationship as most normal married
couples; whether the situation so far as it affects each family member will
be improved or worsened by a divorce; and whether adjustments short
of a divorce decree can solve the problems that the parties conceive to exist.
Such an approach to the solution of social problems is not an unwar-
ranted or unusual projection of the law into private affairs. Nor may it be
reasonably considered an improper invasion of the individual's rights to
privacy. The state has always since modem times maintained its interest
in marriage by regulating the right to marry by forbidding those under a
certain age or under mental disabilities to enter into the marriage
state. Those qualified to marry have complete freedom to function within
their own family groups unless and until they have developed a situation
which they or at least one spouse feels cannot be controlled within the
family unit. This situation then calls for the injection of the state, acting
through its courts, into the family problem. The creation of this condition
is not too unlike the impact of the juvenile court upon a family, acting
through one of the children of the family group who has committed certain
acts which the pertinent law proscribes and denominates delinquent be-
haviour. In this situation, a properly oriented and equipped juvenile court
will not necessarily abruptly terminate the relationships within the family
unit by forthwith committing the child to an institution, but will make
every effort to strengthen the family in an attempt to correct, wherever
possible, those influences and conditions which may have contributed to
64. §§ 451.010, .090, RSMo 1959.
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the improper actions of the child. This period of probation and supervision
by the juvenile court in its effort to rehabilitate the juvenile has long been
accepted as a proper sphere of activity by government and its juvenile
courts.
Similarly, in the criminal field, the proper administration of modern
criminal justice regards as one of its essential and most valuable tools the
services of a trained staff to supply the court with reports of presentence
investigations and adequate supervision for probation and parole. " '
The activity of government and the courts in insisting that their im-
pact upon the individual does not abruptly end upon a finding of delinquency
or of guilt is not only passively received as a proper function of government
well within proper and acceptable constitutional and legal limits, but is
within the area of required action by government which it must supply to
the governed.
The idea that the responsibility of society, the state acting through
its courts, is not restricted to a formal hearing of charges and countercharges
in the divorce hearing is not novel. At least some courts in our land have
so construed their responsibility. These courts recognize that there is much
more to the marital difficulties of the spouses than is made apparent by the
recital of the symptoms of problems by the parties, and have injected the
idea of a conciliatory process in the usually contentious proceedings. They
have called upon the skills of other professions (as have the criminal and
juvenile courts) to aid in seeking a possible solution to marital problems.
The recognition of the primary fact that the court is dealing with people
with problems which for the most part may be solved without a divisive
decree terminating the marriage, and not necessarily with a plaintiff and
defendant in an adversary proceeding in which one must emerge "victori-
ous" and the other a "loser," is the basic difference in the attitude of those
courts which are successfully reducing the number of divorces in their
jurisdictions. 66
65. TAPPAN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 529-84.
66. In the Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common Pleas of
Lucas County, Ohio, Paul W. Alexander, Judge, 41% of all divorce actions were
dismissed in 1960. This compares with a national average of 30%. Annual report
of Family Court of Lucas County (Toledo, Ohio) at 2 (1960). This favorable re-
sult was accomplished primarily by the use of family and marriage counseling
offered by the court and by community agencies. Judge Alexander advised the
writer in a recent communication that "The pre-litigation marriage counseling
effort shows a 62% success result. That is . . . of all pre-litigation counseling efforts
(situations where divorce is definitely threatening) only 38% go on to filing."
In Los Angeles County, California, the Conciliation Court (which is a part
of the Court of Domestic Relations) indicated that of all cases filed in 1959
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The use of conciliation and family and marriage counseling does not
mean that litigation is or should. be eliminated in divorce. But the question
involved is the effectiveness of litigation used exclusively. The vast majority
of divorce cases are uncontested. Statistics compiled for the entire nation in-
dicate that approximately 85 per cent of the cases are not contested.67 In
Missouri, uncontested divorce cases constitute over 91 per cent of the total.s
Any argument that the conciliation method would restrict the use of the ad-
versary process would seem to be almost moot. Matters of disagreement in
91 per cent of the divorce cases heard in the courts of Missouri are adjusted
before the hearing. This obviously is done in the lawyer's office. And it is
suggested that the prime motivating factor that produces these office settle-
ments is the remarkable theory of recrimination that "if both parties have
the right to a divorce, neither party has."69 Thus the threat of using the
defense of recrimination to bar plaintiff's action forces the disposition of
the real issues outside of the supervision and control of the courts. The
adjustment of the problems is a matter of negotiation between the parties,
quite possibly in a climate in which the more guilty but financially
stronger spouse has a whip hand. It is this very process, fostered by the
continuing adherence of the courts to the unreasonable and arbitrary recrim-
ination theory, which eliminates judicial supervision in 91 per cent
of the divorce cases in Missouri. The court does not have before it
the case in all its particulars but is presented only with bare formal com-
pliance with the law for its stamp of approval on a default case that has
been arranged by the parties through their lawyers. This pre-arranged
presentation may well have the reluctant approval of the parties, but they
are motivated by the idea of securing the best bargain they can under the
circumstances, having uppermost in mind the fear of the use of recrimina-
tion and economic pressure. This may be good "horse trading," but it fails
to take into consideration the real issues which are of importance to society,
the best interests of the spouses and their children in continuing or terminat-
ing the marriage, and the interest of the state in preserving the family unit.
In many cases, it may be argued that the default device smacks of
48.8% resulted in reconciliations, and for the first half of 1960 over 50% were
reconciled. For a five year period prior to 1959, it is reported that the average
number of reconciliations has been 43%, and a check made after one year indicates
that 75% have remained reconciled. See "The Conciliation Court of Los Angeles
County," a report issued July 15, 1960.
67. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 120 (1959).
68. 1960 Mo. DEP'T OF PuB. HEALTH & WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS OF MIS-
SOURI 57 (1961).
69. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 43 Mo. 547, 549 (1869).
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collusion. This may be true, but the court is unable to determine that fact.
Thus the cases which are more likely to be heard by the court as contested
matters are those in which a spouse resorts to recrimination for malice or
greed because he has failed to bargain successfully outside of court, and not
from a sincere desire to preserve the marriage.
The elimination of the bargaining club of recrimination as an absolute
bar to divorce would induce both parties to present the relevant facts fully.
But the court in order to function properly must not be limited to the alter-
natives of divorce or dismissal of the case but should be empowered to
apply the preventive and remedial resources of the entire community-social
service case workers, psychiatrists, physicians, marriage counsellors, and
other professional services-in a cooperative effort to solve the problems of
the family. Thereby the court would be in a better position to determine
what the best interests of the family require. Many families are dead
sociologically when they come to court, and on these the court can only per-
form a judicial autopsy. Others, and perhaps this is true of a majority, are
merely ill, and it is this vast group which may be rehabilitated through
the individualized treatment which the court can provide in cooperation
with other professions.
In dealing with each family on this highly personalized basis, where the
facts indicate to the court that such action may be helpful to the family,
the court must be authorized to enter preliminary orders from time to
time to meet such changing situations that may arise. The family during
this period would be aided or supervised either by a court-attached worker
or a community resource cooperating with the court, much as the juvenile
court retains jurisdiction and supervision over a child within its jurisdic-
tion. The final decree of dismissal or divorce would be in effect the de-
termination of the court that in the best interest of all parties concerned,
as well as the state, the marriage should continue or end.
The basic stability of the family unit should not be impaired by unreal
grounds for dissolution or by procedures that are formal, hasty, and unable
to deal with the problems that are involved. At the other extreme and to
be equally condemned are artificial and rigid restrictions on the dissolution
of the family that may result in meretricious relations which are damaging
to the institution of marriage.70
70. Prior to the enactment of a divorce code in South Carolina in 1949, there
evolved in that state a "common law" that included both social and legal recogni-
tion of extramarital family relationships which prescribed the proportionate share
of property which a married man could give to the woman who was not his lawful
wife. JAcoBsoN, op. cit. supra note 67, at 110.
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In each case a searching appraisal must be made of the advantages or
harm to family members in the continuance or termination of the marriage,
and consideration must be given to the interest of society in marriage gen-
erally. Pragmatically this may be approached by a declaration that divorce
should be decreed only for permanent marital disruption. This can be
achieved by discarding the concept of fault within existing laws. It can be
facilitated by adding non-fault grounds for divorce primarily in the form of
a "living apart" statute. The removal of recrimination as a bar would reduce
marital stalemates and, to a great extent, would eliminate the potential
fraud, both upon one of the parties as well as the court, of prearranged non-
contested dispositions. Living apart statutes as constituting in themselves
a basis for divorce have been adopted in twenty states and Puerto Rico and
the District of Columbia in varying forms.71 Generally, in most of these juris-
dictions the doctrines of fault and recrimination do not apply. The period of
separation varies from two to ten years. A reasonable period of continuous
disruption of the family's living together would appear to be a sound indica-
tion of its permanence and should be a condition precedent to its final
termination by judicial decree, provided of course, that the living apart is
caused by marital discord.
The fault concept is carried out in penal form in a statute72 which re-
quires the forfeiture by the "guilty party" of all rights and claims under the
marriage. The financial status of the spouses, their needs in relation to their
ages and economic and social status, their contribution to the family estate,
their health, earning ability or capacity and all other valid considerations
in determining the right to alimony are totally eliminated if the party in
want is, under the rule of decisions, determined to be the "guilty party."
Public policy would be better served if alimony were determined on the
basis of actual need rather than as a punishment for "guilt" as defined in
an adversary proceeding for the termination of the marital status.
Implicit in eliminating the fault concept in divorce proceedings and its
adversary nature would be legal recognition of the fact that the termination
of the marital status by a decree of divorce with its doubtful implications
is not an award to a successful litigant. The decree would terminate the
marital status for both parties equally as a decree of a court of equity
would terminate a partnership.
71. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34.1202(7) (1947) (three years); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 403.020(1) (b) (1960) (five years); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4629(4)
(1960) (seven years).
72. § 452.090, RSMo 1959.
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Since we have lived for so many years with the false concept that the
legal grounds for divorce represent the true causes of marriage failure, and
have failed to recognize the truth that divorce is but the formal and legal
recognition of marriage failure, one cannot be overly optimistic about a
general public and legal acceptance of a complete change in the approach
to a solution of this problem. The concept of guilt or innocence in marriage
failure cannot be evaluated on any proper basis. In the highly intimate rela-
tionship of family status, conflicts of personality almost inevitably develop.
These conflicts are resolved for most families, within their own family circle.
For others who think they are unable to cope with them, the escape hatch
through divorce appears as their only solution. But this is only an illusion,
for divorce seldom solves problems. In fact the divorce route is sometimes
labeled an emotional disease leading the victim from one apparently im-
possible situation into another.
Again, public policy dictates that before a court pronounces a marriage
ended by pinning a label of guilt or innocence on one or the other of the
spouses, a reasonable effort be exerted to determine whether or not the mar-
riage is in fact terminated. If the marriage is one in legal form only, it
should be terminated. But, if the marriage does exist validly but is suffering
from the innumerable problems that the parties themselves are incapable
of resolving, assistance should be given to revitalize the relationship.
Although building upon a foundation that is as unsound as we believe
our divorce laws to be may not appear to be good policy, it is nevertheless
impractical to suppose that the legislature in one fell swoop will abandon
the existing pattern of divorce laws. Accordingly, it is submitted that the
adoption of a statute that would permit divorce courts to apply the skills of
other professionals in an attempt to resolve marital problems would be an
appropriate step. It would not do violence to the existing pattern of divorce
actions and would establish a proving ground to demonstrate the effective-
ness of this approach to the problem.73
73. Such legislation was considered by the Missouri 71st General Assembly in
the following form as House Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 201:
Section 1. Each circuit court of the respective judicial circuits while
sitting in matters of divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, child
custody in connection therewith and child custody in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, alimony and support, may exercise the family counseling powers
conferred by this act.
Section 2. 1. In each of the several judicial circuits, or in such com-
bination of circuits as shall be agreed upon by the judges thereof, thejudge or judges or such circuit or combination of circuits may appoint
one or more domestic relations counselors and such other persons as assist-
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A ready-made gauge is available to measure the validity of this proposal
statistically. The present divorce rate in Missouri having been consistently
higher than the national average, the impact of the proposed procedure, if
ants and clerks as may be deemed necessary, to serve during the pleasure
of the appointing power.
2. The compensation and expenses of the personnel appointed under
the provisions of this act shall be paid monthly out of county funds said
compensation and expenses shall be subject to the approval of the county
court or other governing body except that the compensation and expenses
of those serving two or more counties in a judicial circuit are payable out
of county funds and prorated among the counties served upon a ratio
determined by a comparison of the respective population of the counties.
Section 3. Domestic relations counselors shall, when directed by the
judge of any circuit court, perform the following duties in domestic rela-
tions cases and such other duties as any judge of the circuit court may
assign to them:
(1) Promptly receive all requests for counseling services for the pur-
poses of disposing of them pursuant to this act.
(2) Investigate the facts upon which to base subpoenas, orders or
other court directions in proceedings filed in the circuit court.
(3) When a petition has been filed, and when either party requests
the same, or in the discretion of the court when minor children are in-
volved, interview and counsel each plaintiff and, when feasible and de-
sirable, each defendant, or confer with both jointly, for the purpose of
reconciling the differences between them, and may make recommendations
to the judge of the circuit court. Upon the failure or refusal of either party
to participate in such an interview or conference and after such party
having had written notice to do so the court may, either on its own
motion or the motion of the domestic relations counselor or any interested
person, order such party to appear at a time and place certain for such in-
terview or conference, and the court may enforce this order in the same
manner in which other orders are enforced.
(4) Upon request of a circuit court judge, make post-divorce studies
of problems arising in connection with child custody, support and visita-
tion, give assistance to the parties in the enforcement of support orders,
and cause such reports to be made, such statistics to be compiled, and
such records to be kept as the judge of the court may direct.
(5) Counsel husband or wife, or both, without fee and without the
filing of a complaint for divorce, annulment or separate maintenance if
they have marital difficulties which may lead to a termination of the mar-
riage relation when a signed request for such services has been made of
the domestic relations counselor.
Section 4. The judge of a circuit court may in his discretion, recom-
mend the aid of a public or private welfare agency, physician, psychi-
atrist, psychologist, marriage counselor, social service worker, and the
judge may require either spouse or both to appear before such designated
agency or person to receive counseling.
Section 5. The use of counseling services provided under this act,
and action taken which has been recommended by the counselor, shall not
be construed as a condonation on the part of either spouse of acts that
may constitute grounds for divorce.
Section 6. All counseling proceedings, interviews or conferences shall
be held in private. All communications verbal or written, from the parties
to the judge, domestic relations counselor or other persons designated or
recommended under these sections in a counseling or conciliation proceed-
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successful, should tend to reduce this discrepancy even though, it is recog-
nized, many other factors may be involved in such a decline.
The success of such an experiment would greatly improve the receptive-
ness of the public and the legislature towards a complete elimination of the
fault doctrine in divorce.
ing shall be deemed to be made in confidence and shall not be admissable
or usable for any purpose in any divorce hearing or any other proceeding.
Signed requests for informal counseling services and any other papers or
records relating thereto shall be confidential.
Section 7. 1. Nothing contained in this act shall be construed as in
any way affecting the court's power to make allowances for support,
maintenance and attorney's fees pending the litigation.
2. If after a reasonable time it appears that the use of counseling
hereunder is not effective the court shall, upon application of either party,
set the cause for hearing on its trial docket.
Section 8. In order to assist the court in making equitable orders
in relation to the support and custody of children, the domestic relations
counselor, in all cases involving minor children when so directed by the
court, shall make a study of the family relations, earning ability, and finan-
cial status of the parties and other factors pertinent to the custody, sup-
port and general welfare of the children, and shall file a verified report of
such study not later than ten days before the date set for the divorce
or separate maintenance hearing unless the time be shortened by order of
the court. The report of the domestic relations counselor shall be made
available to either party or his counsel; and the domestic relations coun-
selor who made the report may be examined by either or both parties at
the hearing. The judge may call the domestic relations counselor, the par-
ties, and other persons as witnesses. The report or any portion thereof
may be received in evidence if no objection is raised to the relevancy, com-
petency, or materiality thereof by either party or his counsel. The re-
port shall be kept in a confidential file not open to inspection except by
the court, the parties and their attorneys of record.
Section 9. 1. The benefits of the provisions contained in these sections
may be invoked by either spouse upon the filing in the office of the
clerk of the circuit court a petition designating the filing spouse as plain-
tiff and the other spouse as defendant, setting forth the fact that the par-
ties were married, the date of such marriage, the names and ages of the
children born of such marriage, and that jurisdictional and statutory
grounds for divorce, annulment or separate maintenance exist under the
laws of Missouri.
2. In the event marriage counseling is successful the court may dis-
miss said petition. If marriage counseling is not successful said petition
may be considered sufficient in form for the court to decree a divorce,
separate maintenance, or annulment and to enter all such further orders and
have the same jurisdiction as though said petition had been filed under the
other provisions of the laws relating to divorce, separate maintenance or
annulment, subject to the right of the court, or either party to require
the filing of an amended petition which would meet all requirements of a
divorce, separate maintenance or annulment petition filed under the other
provisions of the laws relating to such proceedings.
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